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Dan S. Wallach
ABSTRACT
Any voting system must be designed to resist a variety of failures, ranging from
inadvertent misconfiguration to intentional tampering. The problem with conducting
analyses of these issues, particularly across widely divergent technologies, is that it is
very difficult to make apples-to-apples comparisons. This paper considers the use of
a standard technique used in the analysis of algorithms, namely complexity analysis
with its "big-O" notation, which can provide a high-level abstraction that allows for
direct comparisons across voting systems. We avoid the need for making unreliable
estimates of the probability a system might be hacked or of the cost of bribing key
players in the election process to assist in an attack. Instead, we will consider attacks
from the perspective of how they scale with the size of an election. We distinguish
attacks by whether they require effort proportional to the number of voters, effort pro-
portional to the number of poll workers, or a constant amount of effort in order to
influence every vote in a county. Attacks requiring proportionately less effort are
correspondingly more powerful and thus require more attention to countermeasures
and mitigation strategies. We perform this analysis on a variety of voting systems in
their full procedural context, including optical scanned paper ballots, electronic voting
systems, both with and without paper trails, Intemet-based voting schemes, and future
cryptographic techniques.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) recently solicited
submissions for how it might assess the risks of voting systems.' According to its
solicitation:
* Department of Computer Science, Rice University. The author wishes to thank Aaron
Burstein, Ed Felten, Joe Hall, David Jefferson, Doug Jones, Eric Rescorla, David Wagner,
and Nick Weaver for their comments on drafts of this Article. This work was supported in
part by NSF grants CNS-0524211 and CNS-0509297.
See United States Election Assistance Commission, Request for Information-Voting
Systems Risk Assessment, http://www.eac.gov/voting%20systems/voluntary-voting-guidelines
request-for-information-2013-voting-systems-risk-assessment-support (last visited Oct. 6,
2008) [hereinafter Request for Information].
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The first phase will create reference models to be used in the
assessment. This includes developing election process models
to describe the operational context in which voting systems are
used. It also entails developing voting systems models by generic
technology type. This is needed because the types of threats en-
countered and their potential impacts vary by technology.2
The EAC asked the public to suggest how it might develop these models, with
submissions due in April 2008. 3 While these submissions have not yet been made
available to the public, we will discuss some prior work on this topic and then pro-
pose our own solution to this problem.
Clearly, we need an objective, quantifiable method for comparing voting systems.4
Election officials who might purchase one system over another need to be able to
concisely understand the relative insecurities of one product versus another.5 Security
analysts, testing authorities, and regulators need common ground for both setting a
lower bound on acceptable security and for explaining how much better a system is
than whatever the minimum standard requires.6
Qualitative analyses are, for better or worse, the standard method used to make
arguments.7 To pick a well-known example, the U.S. military was investigating the
possibility of allowing its soldiers to vote, from overseas locations, via the Internet.
They convened a panel of experts to conduct a security review. Several of the experts
wrote a "minority report" expressing their concerns with the project,8 leading to its
cancellation and replacement with a fax-based system.9 Alvarez and Hall criticize this
2 United States Election Assistance Commission, Risk Assessment Summary, http://www
.eac.gov/voting%20systems/voluntary-voting-guidelines/docs/risk-assessment-sununary/
(last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
3 See Request for Information, supra note 1.
' See Aaron Burstein et al., Comment on the U.S. Election Assistance Commission's
Request for Information Regarding Voting Systems Risk Assessment Support 1 (2008),
http://josephhall.org/papers/ucb-eacrficomment-20080428.pdf.
' See ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS ABOUT ELECTRONIC VOTING 29-33 (Richard
Celeste et al. eds., 2006).
6 R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, ELECTRONIC ELECTIONS: THE PERKS AND
PREMISES OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 45 (2008).
7 See ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS ABOUT ELECTRONIC VOTING, supra note 5, at
59-62,68-69; BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: PROTECTING
ELECTIONS IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD 9 (2006) [hereinafter MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY],
available at http://www.brennancenter.orgldynamic/subpages/download file_- 39288.pdf.
8 See, e.g., DAVID JEFFERSON Er AL., A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION AND VOTING EXPERIMENT (SERVE) 2-3 (2004), http://www.servesecurity
report.org/paper.pdf. The minority report will be referred to as the SERVE (secure electronic
registration and voting experiment) report.
9 See ALVAREz & HALL, supra note 6, at 85.
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outcome stating, "In the end, a small but vocal segment of the scientific community
opposed the use of scientific experimentation in voting systems and technologies."' °
While the SERVE report's authors were concerned about the fundamental unsuit-
ability of standard consumer platforms (e.g., Microsoft Windows XP plus Internet
Explorer), with the risks of viruses, worms, or other forms of malware that could
easily be engineered to compromise an election," Alvarez and Hall felt that
the central argument in this critique was overly general, ignored
the reality of UOCAVA voting,12 and ignored what would have
been a broad array of project, procedural, and architectural details
of the SERVE registration and voting system, which in all likeli-
hood would have minimized or mitigated their concerns had the
system been used in the planned trial. 3
The SERVE report's authors are absolutely correct in that the weaknesses of
Internet voting are the fundamental properties of how the Internet clients and servers
operate. However, Alvarez and Hall have a valid point when they later note that other
overseas votes are cast by fax, with its own attendant risks.14 With disputes like these,
we need a useful way of getting to some kind of ground truth.
I. OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS
A. Security Metrics
There are many different ways to quantify how secure or insecure a voting system
(or any system) might be, but most of them require us to make approximations and
guesses, among other problems. 5 Burstein et al., in their submission to the EAC
request, make the point that there may well be no one-size-fits-all solution to this
problem.' 6 Nonetheless, we can consider a variety of possibilities.
10 Id. at 77.
11 See JEFFERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 12-15.
12 The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) was enacted
by Congress in 1986. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to ff-6 (2000). UOCAVA requires that the
states and territories allow certain groups of citizens to register and vote absentee in elections
for federal offices. In addition, most states and territories have their own laws allowing citi-
zens covered by UOCAVA to register and vote absentee in state and local elections as well.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIvIL RIGHTS Div., THE UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS
ABSENTEE VOTING ACT, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/activ_uoc.htm (last visited
Oct. 6, 2008).
'" ALVAREZ & HALL, supra note 6, at 85.
14 See id. at 87.
15 See Burstein et al., supra note 4, at 3-4.
16 Id. at 5.
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Threat taxonomies. Jones discusses the possibility of cataloging known threats
against voting systems and creating a taxonomy of those threats. 17 The main benefit
of this activity is that it helps security analysts identify areas where additional analysis
might be desirable.18 The presence or absence of any particular flaw does not, in and
of itself, make it any easier or harder to attack a voting system. An attacker only needs
to find one serious flaw in order to cause significant damage.
Voter performance metrics. Voters are regularly surveyed both before and after
elections as to whom they support for a political office. Voters are also surveyed,
perhaps more rarely, about how well they enjoyed the voting experience, how easily
they could find their local precinct, and so forth. Ultimately, any survey or scientific
study of voters can measure three useful properties of a voting experience: accuracy,
efficiency, and satisfaction. 9
Accuracy refers to how well a voting system captures the voter's intent.2 ° While
"residual votes" (e.g., spoiled ballots) offer a proxy measurement for accuracy, these
measurements can also be taken in controlled laboratory conditions where experi-
mental subjects have no anonymity (nor need for it), and thus their actual votes can
be examined directly. Efficiency is simply the amount of time it takes to complete
the voting procedure. Accuracy and efficiency can be objectively measured, while
satisfaction relies on the voter's subjective opinions, stated in response to standard-
ized questions. All of these dimensions of voter performance are quantifiable, and
provide valuable metrics for examining how well a voting system performs.
Unfortunately, none of these performance metrics have a strong relationship to
security. Two electronic voting systems could appear absolutely identical, from the
voter's perspective, while having completely different underpinnings with radically
different security vulnerabilities. A malicious voting machine could change a vote
without detection, but the voter might still love the experience. Voter performance
metrics do matter in one critical fashion: voting system security procedures often de-
pend on voters or poll workers following procedures correctly. For example, voters
should verify the output of voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) printers to ensure
that it matches their intent. If voters cannot do this, then the security mechanism's
effectiveness is blunted. We will discuss usability issues in more detail when we
compare particular voting systems.
"7 Douglas W. Jones, Threats to Voting Systems (Oct. 2005) (manuscript submitted to NIST
Workshop on Developing an Analysis of Threats to Voting Systems), http://www.cs.uiowa
.edu/-jones/voting/nist2005.shtml.
18 See id.
19 U.S. Gov'T AccouNTABLTY OFFICE, GAO-04-766T, ELECTRONIC VOTING OFFERS
OPPORTUNITIES AND PRESENTS CHALLENGES 24-25 (2004) [hereinafter GAO TESTIMONY],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO4766t.pdf (statement of Randolph C. Hite,
Director, GAO Information Technology Architecture and Systems, before the Subcommittee
on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, House
Committee on Governmental Reform).
20 id.
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Probabilities of failure. We can measure many aspects of elections, but we
cannot measure the odds that a security attack will occur. Election security in the past
is not a good predictor of election security in the future. For example, new vulnera-
bilities may be discovered which change the security landscape overnight. Also, if
insecure systems were used and successfully compromised, evidence that the compro-
mise occurred will not necessarily be known or recognized. The lack of evidence for
prior security attacks against electronic voting machines simply has no bearing on
the degree to which they are vulnerable or might be compromised in the future.
Dollar or time-costs. A tempting metric is to attempt to quantify the dollar cost
or man-hour cost of a security attack.2' This becomes even more attractive if the cost
can be expressed in terms of dollars per vote flipped or man-hours per vote flipped
because it can then be compared against other forms of manipulating voters' behavior
(e.g., television advertisements, direct mail, or phone calls).22 We could even talk
about the dollars or man-hours that must be invested "up front," perhaps as part of
a reverse-engineering process conducted by an attacker, followed by a "per vote" cost
afterward. 23 These metrics are somewhat satisfying, in that they can be easily com-
pared across different voting technologies, but there will be huge errors in any esti-
mates.24 Will it take one month or three months to reverse-engineer a voting machine
and find an exploitable security bug?
Imagine that the bug in question allows an attacker to violate voters' anonymity
but not flip their votes. What, then, is the cost per voter for bribing them to vote in a
particular fashion? A related metric, raised by the Brennan Center Security Report,
is the number of people who must be involved in a conspiracy to compromise a voting
system.25 If more conspirators are required, it would be that much harder for the
attack to go off without detection. 26 As with dollar or man-hour costs, it is difficult to
estimate these numbers accurately, except when only a single person is necessary to
accomplish an attack.27 In many scenarios, this is unrealistic.
28
Complexity analysis. After rejecting all of these metrics, we need an alternative.
For this, we turn to a technique used widely in the analysis of algorithms: complex-
ity analysis.29 Consider being given a pile of insurance forms, each coded with the
client's customer ID number. We are assigned to take this unsorted pile and sort it
such that the customer IDs are strictly increasing through the pile.30 We might start
21 See MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 115.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 9-10, 115.
25 See id. at 9.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 12-13.
28 id.
29 THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGO rHMS 44-45 (2d ed. 2001).
30 A mind-numbing summer job performed by the author while he was in junior high
school.
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a new pile, on the side, in sorted order. Then, for each page from the unsorted pile,
we flip through the sorted pile to find where it belongs. This first technique, called
an insertion sort, will take time proportional to the number of pages (N), squared,
as we have to insert N pages, and each might require us to flip through the whole
stack, which can have up to N pages in it.3' We might instead start by sorting by the
last digit in the ID (the one's digit) into ten separate buckets, putting everything back
together again, then sorting again by the second digit (the ten's digit), and so forth.
This second technique, called a radix sort, takes time proportional to the product of
the number of pages and the number of digits.32 Another technique, cleverly called
a quick sort, has us randomly pick a "pivot," separating the pages into two piles (those
less than and those greater than the pivot).33 Then for each smaller pile, we pick
another pivot and repeat. That process turns out to take an expected time proportional
to the number of pages multiplied by the logarithm of the number of pages.34
The benefit of this style of analysis, called complexity analysis, is that we can take
very different procedures for sorting a pile of paper and focus on a very high level
consideration of the effort we might expend.5 We do not have to worry about whether
it is slightly faster to shuffle the pages in a radix sort or in a quick sort, or to even
worry about the variations that might occur from one run of the procedure to the next.
Instead, this technique requires a rough estimate of the number of operations that we
need to perform in proportion to the size of the problem.
This style of analysis is typically expressed with "big-0" notation. 6 Formally,
0(g(n)) = a functionftn), such that there exists positive constants
c and no such that 0 ( fn) cg(n) for all n > n0.
In other words, if an algorithm is 0(N 2) (pronounced "order N-squared"), we
are saying that the cost of the algorithm approaches some constant times N2. If,
however, N is small, then there are no guarantees, but it does not really matter, for
these purposes, because the running time of the algorithm will not be big enough to
matter.38 In this framework, insertion sort is O(N 2), radix sort with k digit-numbers
is O(kN), and quick sort is O(N log N). Among other clever properties, you can add
these O-expressions together, and the more expensive operation will dominate the
cheaper one. For example, if you have to first pick up the pile of pages from a mess
on the floor, an 0(N) process, then quick-sort them, taking O(N log N) time, the
31 CORMEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 23-25.
32 Id. at 170-73.
31 Id. at 145-58.
See id. at 156.
3 See id. at 41.
36 See id. at 44.
31 See id.
38 See id. at 42.
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sorting time will dominate the pick-up time, so the total cost O(N) + O(N log N) is
equivalent to O(N log N). This sort of complexity analysis is fundamental to the
theory of computer science, and detailed treatments of it can be found in most any
CS theory textbook.
Similarly, big-O notation is a convenient way to evaluate election security. We
can refer to attack costs in terms of the number of precincts or poll workers39 (P), or
the number of voters (N), among other possibilities.4' This style of analysis tends
to discount the upfront cost of discovering a bug (it is a constant, even if it is a big
constant) while focusing on the scalability of the attack.4' Big-0 analyses provide a
more precise characterization for what are commonly referred to as "retail" versus
"wholesale" attacks. If an attack requires you to bribe each voter individually, we
would say it is an O(N) attack, regardless of the number of attackers required to
accomplish the attack.
Our model must indicate how we deal with scalability. If we have P poll workers
attacking N ballots, then each poll worker might well perform O(NIP) work. Ulti-
mately, the interest is in the incremental cost of corrupting N ballots. If each poll
worker already handles N/P ballots, and the incremental cost of their corrupt behavior
is negligible, then we would prefer to say that there is a total O(P) cost in corrupting
N ballots. For example, you may need to get all P poll workers involved if you want
to tamper with N ballots while they are still in the precinct. In this case, the domi-
nating cost of the election fraud is getting the poll workers on board, while the in-
cremental work per poll worker is negligible. In this way, our complexity analysis can
subsume the Brennan Center Security Report's notion of counting the people required,
when that is the limiting factor.
The strongest possible attacks would then be O(1), "constant" cost attacks. If
one or a handful of attackers can change an arbitrary number of ballots, with
minimal effort, that is as bad as an attack could possibly be. When we identify O(1)
attacks on a voting system, that does not mean the voting system is necessarily
unsuitable for use, but it means that extreme procedural measures must be taken to
thwart such attacks. If such measures are infeasible, then the voting system really
should not be used.
" Since there are a presumably constant number of poll workers per precinct, the 0-
expressions will be exactly the same in the analysis whether P refers to the number of poll
workers or precincts. All that would change is the constant c, which disappears when we do
this style of analysis.
0 While one could argue that the number of poll workers is typically a constant fraction
of the population (e.g., one poll worker for every hundred voters), and thus O(P) = O(N), the
two order-of-magnitude difference between the sizes of these populations has a real impact
on the viability of attacks conducted by poll workers versus attacks against individual voters.
It is helpful if our analysis can distinguish corruption requiring P complicit poll workers
versus N complicit voters.
41 See CORMEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 41.
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B. Attacker Goals
Before we conduct complexity analyses on specific voting systems, we first need
to consider what an attacker's goals might be. The standard goals of any attacker in
any security-relevant context are typically attacks against integrity, confidentiality,
and availability.42 Applying these to elections:
Integrity attacks aim to change the election totals.43 A successful integrity
attack is one that survives tallying, recounting, and any subsequent legal challenges.
A simple integrity attack is stuffing ballots into a paper ballot box, combined with
forged signatures in a poll book, to keep everything consistent. An integrity attack,
in this definition, must go undetected, lest the results be overturned or the election
redone from scratch.
Confidentiality or anonymity attacks are a different game." If we can violate
the anonymity of voters through whatever means, then we can potentially bribe or
coerce them to vote however we want. In this case, the election tallies may be entirely
accurate with respect to capturing the voters' stated intent, but the election results
may nonetheless not represent the true preferences of the voters.4 5
Availability attacks (also called denial-of-service attacks or DoS) are attempts
to disrupt the election and can be as simple as physically destroying a voting system,
stealing a ballot box, or cutting power to a building.' DoS attacks, selectively applied,
may introduce biases that affect the election outcome, but they make no attempt at
stealth (e.g., destroying ballot boxes from precincts with known biases).47 A DoS
attack may have as its goal to simply cause a chaotic outcome, or no outcome at all.48
Or, a DoS attack may be acceptable to the attacker if the whole world knows the re-
sults are corrupt, but regular election procedures will have no way to correct the errors
and might then accept the faulty results. In this respect, an integrity attack that is dis-
covered but cannot be undone would, by our definition, be a DoS attack.49 (Perhaps
such attacks could also be classified as "integrity" attacks, but the victor in such a race
would lack some of the legitimacy that can come from a "clean" victory.)
When considering these classes of election attacks against various election sys-
tems, we must make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we will assume that
an attack is focused on a specific county, voting uniformly on a single technology. An
attack against one county would not have an impact on surrounding counties.50
42 See GAO TESTIMONY, supra note 19, at 24-25.
41 See id. at 25.
4 JEFFERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 16-17.
45 Id.
' See id. at 18-19.
41 See id. at 19.
48 See id. at 18-19.
49 See id. at 18-20.
50 In Georgia and Maryland, the whole state votes monolithically on the same electronic
voting system, with centralized resources to maintain their machines. See Campaign for
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Instead, each county would need to be separately attacked. Clearly, the cost of attack-
ing a county with two separate systems is equal to the sum of the costs for attacking
the individual systems. We will also assume that prospective attackers already know
the design and implementation of particular voting technologies. Security must come
either from the strengths of those designs or from the strengths of poll workers and
election officials following procedures correctly.
For every attack we consider, we will consider three variants: attacks originating
from "normal" voters; attacks originating from poll workers, postal employees, and
other intermediaries; and attacks originating from insiders at the election headquarters.
Corrupt insiders obviously pose a greater threat than corrupt voters, requiring corre-
spondingly stronger mechanisms to mitigate against the possibility of such corruption.
For this analysis, we do not consider pattern voting attacks (also sometimes called
the "Italian attack"), where a voter uses unimportant races to encode a unique ID num-
ber, then votes as he or she has been bribed to do on the important races. To the extent
that this attack is a problem, it is a problem on absolutely any voting system that can
produce complete ballot records. In schemes where nobody ever sees the raw ballots
(including VoteBox,5" discussed in more detail below), this would never be a viable
attack.
C. Example Cases
Under this set of attacker goals, there are some ambiguous cases that are worth
considering. In Zimbabwe's recent presidential election, Robert Mugabe initially
lost his re-election bid to Morgan Tsvangirai,52 and then won a revote where his oppo-
nent withdrew amid widespread state-sponsored violence.53 In this case, voters were
still asked to vote, but there is no question that the will of the people was not reflected
in the outcome. The violence was inflicted upon large swathes of the Zimbabwe pop-
ulation, so we would consider it an O(N) attack. Certainly, there was no stealth or
Verifiable Voting in Maryland, An Open Letter to House and Senate Ways and Means
Committee, http://www.truevotemd.org/take-action.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2008); Press
Release, Karen Handel, Ga. Sec'y of State, Secretary Cox Announces Selection of Diebold
Election Systems to Provide New Statewide Electronic Voting System (May 3,2002), available
at http://sos.georgia.gov/pressrel/050302.htm (discussing a contract that the state of Georgia
has with Kennesaw State University to do many aspects of its election administration). In a
scenario like this, a simplification is to treat the state as if it were a single, large county. For
constant-cost attacks, this is likely to be an accurate model.
"' See generally Daniel Sandler et al., VoteBox: A Tamper-Evident, Verifiable Electronic
Voting System, 17 USENIX SECURrrY SYMP. 349 (2008), available at http://www.usenix.org/
events/sec08/tech/full-papers/sandler/sandler.pdf.
52 See Barry Bearak, Mugabe Foes Win Majority in Zimbabwe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,2008,
at Al.
" See Celia W. Dugger & Barry Beaak, Mugabe Is Sworn in to Sixth Term After Victory
in One-Candidate Runoff, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2008, at A8.
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subterfuge as part of the attacks. Instead, the forced withdrawal of Tsvangirai is best
described as a DoS attack. Now, Tsvangirai and his immediate deputies were also
personally subject to harassment and violence, and were forbidden access to state-
controlled news media.54 This could be classified as an 0(1) DoS attack. There were
also allegations of voters' anonymity being systematically violated at the polls: an
O(N) confidentiality attack. Unsurprisingly, the legitimacy of Mugabe's victory is
easy to call into question.
A similar instructive example is the election of "landslide" Lyndon Johnson for
the U.S. Senate in 1948.'5 Texas, at the time, was largely controlled by the Democratic
Party, so the Democratic primary election was to be decisive for who would win the
Senate seat.5 6 In that election, which went to a runoff between Johnson and former
Texas Governor Coke Stevenson, Johnson defeated Stevenson by an "87-vote land-
slide."57 Much attention has focused on ballot stuffing in Jim Wells County's infamous
"Box 13," but ballot box stuffing, among other fraudulent behavior, was apparently the
norm across the state.58 Counties were allowed to report "revisions" to their tallies
in the week following the election, allowing local party bosses to continuously adjust
their vote totals to assist their preferred candidate.5 9 Baum and Hailey note that, had
the original, unrevised tallies been used, Johnson would have still defeated Stevenson
by 506 votes.' They conclude that Johnson won largely on the strength of his turnout
efforts, or rather the lackluster turnout efforts of his opponent.61
Classifying the attacks in this race is tricky. Individual voters' poll taxes were
often paid by the political campaigns, but their votes were still ostensibly cast pri-
vately.62 Still, a well-funded operation to pay for more voters would be classifiable
as an O(N) integrity attack, since each voter was individually brought in. This assumes
a candidate's operation can accurately select its supporters, to pay their poll taxes,
without paying for its competition. Ballot stuffing and poll book manipulation is
clearly O(P), since there are P ballot boxes that would need to be compromised, but
is it an integrity attack or a DoS attack? The "Box 13" story is all about the discovery
of clearly fraudulent signatures in the poll books, and similar fraud likely occurred
elsewhere in the state without undergoing the same level of scrutiny. 63 Based on our
scheme, the clear presence of the "Box 13" fraud, combined with the inability of
5 Id.
" See Dale Baum & James L. Hailey, Lyndon Johnson's Victory in the 1948 Texas Senate
Race: A Reappraisal, 109 POL. Sci. Q. 595 (1994).
56 See id. at 596.
5 See id. at 595.
58 See id. at 596.
9 See id. at 610.
6 id.
61 See id. at 598-99.
62 See id. at 604.
63 See id. at 608-10.
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anybody to correct the problem, would make it a DoS attack, while other ballot-
stuffing events that went undiscovered would be integrity attacks. In other words,
ballot stuffing can be a successful attack, whether or not it is discovered, so long as
the election results are not thrown out and the election redone from scratch. 64
II. APPLYING COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS TO VOTING SYSTEMS
A. Absentee Paper Voting (Vote-by-Mail)
All of Oregon's voters cast their votes by mail, with a large number of voters in
other states increasingly preferring this voting mechanism for its comfort and conve-
nience.65 Of course, by voting in an unsupervised location (i.e., in the voter's home),
there is no enforcement of anonymity for voters. This means that vote selling, by
voters, is an O(N) attack, because each voter must individually be bribed or coerced.
The postal mail is likewise far from a safe and secure delivery channel. With P postal
workers (simplifying assumption: the number of postal mail routes is proportionate
to the number of voting precincts), one could imagine a variety of O(P) confidentiality
attacks (example: steaming open envelopes to read their contents, with each of the
P postal workers reading NIP ballots). Once postal votes reach the election head-
quarters, confidentiality attacks potentially drop to as low as an 0(1) cost, requiring
at most a handful of corrupt election workers.
Integrity attacks and DoS attacks will follow the same pattern. Individual voters
could individually modify ballots from their neighbor, spouse, tenants, and so forth-
O(N) effort-requiring nothing more sophisticated than steam to open an envelope,
or fire to destroy one. Similarly, P postal workers could open envelopes and either
spoil undesirable ballots, substitute alternative ballots, or simply fail to deliver those
ballots-an O(P) attack. Election headquarters employees can potentially mount O(1)
integrity and DoS attacks, since they are already individually handling each ballot.
The postal system has large central sorting facilities. Employees in these locations
could potentially mount O(1) DoS attacks (e.g., destroying ballots from particular
zip codes), but their ability to mount integrity attacks would vary. In a large city, the
speed with which mail is processed would preclude centrally attacking individual en-
velopes.66 In smaller towns and counties, O(1) postal attacks against integrity might
also be possible.
' See Sarah P. Everett, The Usability of Electronic Voting Machines and How Votes Can
Be Changed Without Detection 28 (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Rice University)
(on file with author).
6' See H.R. REP. No. 110-581, at 3 (2008).
66 Cf Press Release, U.S. Postal Serv., Postal Service High-Speed Sorters Get Smarter,
Faster: Board of Governors Approve Funding for New Technology (Apr. 2,2008), available
at http://www.usps.com/communications/newsroom/2008/prO8_O32.htm.
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The existence of these O(1) attacks clearly demands strong procedural controls
to prevent them, such as "separation of privilege" procedures where, for example,
one worker examines the outer envelope for voter registration information, passing
along an inner envelope, holding the ballot, to a separate worker who does not know
the identity of the original voter. Of course, both workers could collude and defeat
the system. Additional measures, such as having many more employees dividing the
labor, installing round-the-clock video surveillance of areas where ballots are han-
dled, or having ballots with hidden marks passing through the system as a check
against tampering would certainly be appropriate.67 Even if the resulting system is
still vulnerable to O(1) attacks, additional constant factors of difficulty are far better
than nothing. Similarly, the risks from the postal channel would seem to require
sophisticated tamper-evident envelopes.68 If the effort necessary to steam open an
envelope without detection was sufficiently high, it might become infeasible for
regular postal workers to open and modify ballots without taking too much time, and
thus being more easily detected.69
B. Paperless, Electronic Voting Systems
Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting system vendors have made a number
of claims about their security. Following the California "Top to Bottom" Reports,
the Ohio EVEREST Reports, and the Florida "SALT" study conducted in the wake of
the Sarasota 2006 problem, we now know many of these claims to be false.7" Based
on that work, for every major commercial DRE voting system used in the U.S., we
can summarize these systems' security as follows.
Anonymity attacks require O(P) effort. P poll workers would need to each
record the order in which voters appeared before each machine-a minimal addi-
tional effort beyond the work they already perform as part of the voter registration
process. In some states, voter sign-in logs are already recorded in order, as a matter
67 See SRINIVAS INGUVA ET AL., SOURCE CODE REVIEW OF THE HART INTERCIVIC VOTING
SYSTEM 18 (July 20, 2007), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-systems/ttbr/Hart-
source-public.pdf (report commissioned as part of the California Secretary of State's "Top-
to-Bottom" Review of California Voting Systems).
68 See generally Tal Moran & Moni Naor, Polling with Physical Envelopes: A Rigorous
Analysis ofa Human-Centric Protocol, 25 ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY 88 (2006) (suggesting
methods of increasing envelope security).
69 See id.
70 See generally JOSEPH A. CALANDRINO ET AL., SOURCE CODE REVIEW OF THE DIEBOLD
VOTING SYSTEM (July 20, 2007) (on file with author); OHIO SEC'Y OF STATE, EVEREST
PROJECr, PROJECT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT (2008) [hereinafter EVEREST REPORT],
available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/everest/00-SecretarysEVERESTExecutive
Report.pdf; ALEC YASINSAC ET AL., SOFrWARE REVIEW AND SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR THE
ES&S IVOTRONIc 8.0.1.2 VOTING MACHiNE FIRMWARE (2007) [hereinafter SAIT STUDY],
available at http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/-daw/papers/sarasota07.pdf.
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of course, dropping the complexity of the attack to O(1), since no poll workers must
be corrupted! After that, due to poor engineering of the DRE systems, including easy
poll worker access to the ballot records, the order in which votes were cast can be
recovered from the electronic records kept by these systems.7" A variety of engineer-
ing tactics can and should be taken to improve this situation, but none are yet de-
ployed.72 In the best possible case, however, we could still imagine O(P) attacks that
do not rely on poor engineering of the voting machines. As an example, small video
cameras could be surreptitiously installed in the ceiling above a machine to record
its screen as it is used. Consequently, improving anonymity attacks beyond O(P) will
be a difficult problem to tackle.
Due to poor engineering practices of the DRE vendors, integrity and DoS attacks
require 0(1) effort for normal voters-the worst possible case. The California, Ohio,
and Florida analyses discovered "viral" attacks against these voting systems.73 A
single attacker, tampering with a single voting system, can inject a custom-engineered
virus.74 This virus can then take advantage of the poor software engineering of other
parts of the voting system and spread from one voting machine to another, based
entirely on the usual procedures carried out by election officials.75 In the case of
Diebold's DRE systems, the virus can spread through the smartcards used to autho-
rize the machines to accept votes.76 In the case of Hart InterCivic's DRE system, one
DRE can infect a back-end system used in the election administration's warehouse for
inventory control, among other purposes.7 This system can then infect any subse-
quent DRE connected to it.7 8 An infection introduced in one election can then be pres-
ent in every voting machine used by the county in its subsequent elections. 79 This
infection could then have a variety of negative behaviors, ranging from flipping
71 See J. Alex Halderman et al., You Go to Elections with the Voting System You Have:
Stop-Gap Mitigationsfor Deployed Voting Systems, 2008 USENIACCURATEEEcrRONIc
VOTING TECH. WORKSHOP, § 5.2, available at http://www.usenix.org/events/evt08/tech/full
_papers/halderman/halderman.pdf.
72 See id. at Abstract.
71 See id. at § 1.3; see also CALANDRINO ETAL., supra note 70; EVEREST REPORT, supra
note 70; SAIT STUDY, supra note 70.
74 See Halderman et al., at § 1. A side question is whether a normal voter might have
sufficient access to open the case of a voting machine or otherwise conduct an attack. In
practice, voting machines are often left unguarded in relatively public places. Furthermore,
some vendors support a "curb-side voting" procedure, where disabled voters who cannot
physically enter the polling place can be accommodated by bringing voting machines out to
them instead. Curb-side voting gives attackers the necessary time and privacy to conduct an
attack. Many of the attacks could even be conducted by a voter while in the voting booth.
71 See id.
76 See Everett, supra note 64, at 28-29.
71 See INGUVA ET AL., supra note 67, at 77.
78 See id.
79 See id.
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
votes through simply deleting them en masse.80 If the vendors were to repair all the
bugs found in these studies, and no other bugs remained to be discovered, these
attacks would become O(P)-poll workers would need to tamper with each physical
voting system to cause it to misbehave.
A number of procedural measures are commonly suggested for dealing with
some of these vulnerabilities. "Logic and accuracy testing" (L&A testing) typically
involves casting a handful of votes for each candidate and then tabulating the votes.8'
It is trivial for a tampered machine to determine when it is being tested like this and
to behave correctly. 2 Likewise, L&A testing, conducted by election officials prior to
an election, cannot detect tampering conducted by poll workers or normal voters once
machines are in the field. 3 L&A testing, if not conducted carefully, can even result
in test votes that appear in the final election tally.' Similarly, "hash code testing," a
process for verifying that the software inside a voting machine matches the software
that is supposed to be there, is ineffectual against sophisticated attackers, who can ar-
range for a corrupt machine to respond as a proper machine would to any of the tests. 5
As an example, Hart InterCivic's system has a very detailed mechanism intended to
detect code tampering. 6 But, the California review found it to be easily subverted. 7
Parallel testing takes a set of voting machines, randomly pulled from general cir-
culation, and instead tests them, on election day, in a controlled and videotaped envi-
ronment.88 Any misbehavior of the voting machines would then be caught. Parallel
testing procedures can discover the presence of many (but not necessarily all) integrity
and DoS attacks, but will have no effect on anonymity attacks, or attacks that are in-
stalled by poll workers or attackers, on the site of specific precincts when the election
begins.8 9 Likewise, while parallel testing might discover such attacks, it offers no way
to prevent them or recover from them.9' At its best, parallel testing converts integrity
attacks, previously undetected, into DoS attacks, without itself offering any way to
recover the original intent of the voters.91
80 See Everett, supra note 64, at 30.
81 See INGUVA ET AL., supra note 67, at 79-82.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 82.
s4 See DAN S. WALLACH, SECURITY AND RELIABILrrYOF WEBB COUNTY'S ES&S VOTING
SYSTEM ANDTHE MARCH '06 PRIMARY ELECTION (2006), available at http://accurate-voting
.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/09/webb-report2.pdf (the author's expert report in Flores v.
Lopez).
5 See INGUVA Er AL., supra note 67, at 43.
86 See id. at 42.
87 See id. at 40.
88 See id. at 81.
89 See id. at 82.
9 See id.
9' See id.
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C. Electronic Voting Machines with VVPAT Printers
In response to objections from computer scientists and activists, and to require-
ments by many states, DRE vendors now offer a variety of "voter-verified paper audit
trail" (VVPAT) attachments for their machines. 92 The major U.S. vendors all use a
reel-to-reel thermal printer, behind glass. 93 Voters may see the record of their vote but
may not touch it. Because the paper is never cut, these devices record votes in the
order cast.' For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that these printers are
actually working properly (versus anecdotal evidence that they suffer mechanical
failures) and that voters will actually read them (even though controlled human
subject experiments suggest that two-thirds would fail to see any discrepancies). 95
Confidentiality attacks are still O(P), based purely on the electronic results being
easily de-anonymized (as described above for paperless DRE systems, and would like-
wise drop to 0(1) if poll workers or electronic poll books recorded the order in which
voters appeared as their standard operating procedure). Additionally, the recording of
votes in the order cast on the VVPAT paper tapes similarly allows for O(P) attacks.96
If the paper were cut after each voter and piled up in a random order in a bag of some
kind, then the VVPAT attachment would no longer be the most obvious way to con-
duct a confidentiality attack.97
Tampering and DoS attacks improve from O(1), with paperless DREs, to O(P),
with VVPAT printers, by virtue of increasing the burden on the attacker. Now the
attacker must also perform O(P) effort to consistently tamper with the VVPAT print-
outs. This implies that VVPAT, even poorly implemented, yields a significant com-
plexity improvement relative to existing DREs' security performance. However,
achieving this improvement requires that election officials reconcile the VVPAT
results against the electronic results.98 Given Everett's findings that many voters will
fail to notice errors on VVPAT results, 99 election officials must be particularly attuned
to even a very low rate of complaints, creating a secondary vulnerability, namely that
voters could falsely claim to have observed discrepancies in order to cause perfectly
good equipment to be removed from service-an O(P) DoS attack.'I°
In response to the California and Ohio studies, Halderman et al. considered miti-
gations that might improve the security of electronic voting systems. They describe
92 See, e.g., id. at 9 (discussing how VVPAT is required by law in California).
9' See id. at 9, 15.
94 See id. at 9.
9' See Everett, supra note 64, at 1, 86.
9 See INGUVA Er AL., supra note 67, at 9.
97 See, e.g., id. at 68 (discussing one method of maintaining recorded votes out of sequence,
in an effort to increase voter anonymity).
98 See id. at 75-76.
99 Everett, supra note 64, at 86.
100 See INGUVA EY AL., supra note 67, at 76.
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
detailed system-specific procedures that can mitigate many (but not all) O(1) attacks
against these systems. 1 Their techniques expand on the concepts described above,
and rely on having the VVPAT paper trails.' °2 In the end, they cannot prevent integ-
rity attacks, but they can limit the degree to which they spread and can increase the
confidence with which they may be discovered." 3 On paperless DRE systems, vari-
ations on their techniques might improve some of the O(1) integrity attacks to O(P)
attacks as well. Many of the mitigations proposed by Halderman et al. require custom
hardware "gadgets" for purposes such as clearing memory cards." No such gadgets
exist, and it is unclear that such gadgets could legally be used without being certified
by the appropriate federal and state authorities."15
D. Precinct-Based Optical Scan Systems
While some activists feel that the only safe way to vote is to count ballots by hand,
optical scanning of ballots adds significant efficiencies to the process, particularly
in modem American elections where voters may be asked to respond to thirty or
forty separate issues. There are two main styles of ballot scanners: precinct-based
scanners and central scanners. The former is attached to the top of a ballot box, while
the latter is installed at the central election headquarters.' °6 Precinct scanners can issue
warnings or errors in cases of under- or over-voted ballots, potentially improving
accuracy.0 7 From a security perspective, the hand-marked paper ballots constitute
a voter-verifiable paper trail, providing an independent path to determine the voters'
intent, in cases where the electronic records may be called into question.'08 For this
analysis, we will assume that the paper records are, indeed, reconciled against the elec-
tronic tallies. Without mandatory reconciliation or auditing, the security analysis
would be much more pessimistic.
Precinct scanners offer comparable anonymity to any other technology.' 9 A
malicious scanner can record votes in the order in which they were cast-an O(P)
attack, since P different scanners must be corrupted."0 Vulnerabilities have been
o See Halderman, supra note 71.
102 See, e.g., id. (suggesting a 100% manual count of the VVPAT records).
103 Id. at § 7.
14 Id. at § 2.
105 See id.
106 Id. at § 1.4.
o MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 81; see also David Chaum et al.,
Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability for Optical Scan Election Systems Using Invisible
Ink Confirmation Codes, 2008 USENIXIACCURATE ELECRONIC VOTING TECH. WORKSHOP,§ 4.4 (2008), available athttp:/www.usenix.org/events/evt08/tech/full~papers/chauni/chaunpdf.
108 MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 82; Chaum et al., supra note 107, at § 1.
9 Chaum et al., supra note 107, at § 5.2.
"'3 Cf supra Part I.A.
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found in commercial optical scanners, as part of the California and Ohio studies,
showing that even unmodified scanners are improperly engineered, allowing the order
in which votes were cast to be recovered."' If these known-flawed optical scanners
were used in precincts that recorded the order in which voters sign in, as a matter of
regular procedure, that combination would lower the complexity of an anonymity
attack to O(l).112
The integrity guarantees of precinct scanners are quite good, assuming proper
auditing of the paper ballots occurs after the election. If the electronic records were
compromised, the paper records could be used to reconstruct them, either via a dif-
ferent scanner or by hand. If the paper records were compromised, the electronic rec-
ords could be used as a back-up. Successful integrity attacks are thus an O(P) process.
An attacker would need to modify both the electronic records and the paper ballots
in a consistent fashion and would need to attack each precinct in turn.
Precinct scanners resist DoS attacks reasonably well. Even in the worst case,
if they are completely broken, poll workers can remove them from the ballot boxes,
falling back on the central scanners. Still, precinct scanners are vulnerable to the
variety of O(P) attacks that threaten any precinct (e.g., cutting the power), as well as
attacks such as intercepting or spoiling the paper ballots while in transit.
Centrally scanned ballots, whether used as a fallback for failed precinct ballot
scanners or just used for mail-in votes, are clearly subject to O(1) insider attacks.
Auditing procedures would clearly be necessary to double-check that the electronic
tallies correspond accurately to the paper ballots.
E. Internet Voting (Via Home Computers)
We can conduct all manner of high-dollar commerce on our home computers,
so why not vote? Indeed, Estonia has done this, as have a handful of other
elections." 3 Of course, there are significant differences between the world of e-
commerce and the world of e-voting. Commercial fraud happens all the time
(identity theft, etc.), leading to a huge industry that deals with this fraud. Nonethe-
less, e-commerce succeeds because the total volume of legitimate commerce dwarfs
the volume and expense of fraud.
Furthermore, commercial transactions are not anonymous." 14 Customers, mer-
chants, and their banks carefully record these transactions. If and when discrepancies
arise, customers can challenge merchants, and everybody can settle on the proper
"'. See, e.g., EVEREST REPORT, supra note 70, at 40-41.
112 Id.
113 Sutton Meagher, Comment, When Personal Computers Are Transformed Into Ballot
Boxes: How Internet Elections in Estonia Comply with the United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 349, 355 (2008).
114 Id. at 395-96.
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outcome. In e-voting, however, votes must be anonymous. Without anonymity,
bribery and coercion become valid O(N) threats against the election.
If we want to use home computers to vote over the Internet, that means dealing
with Microsoft Windows and Internet Explorer, for which new security vulnerabilities
are discovered on a depressingly regular basis (not to say that any other consumer
computing platforms are necessarily any better in this regard). One of the key risks
these vulnerabilities create is that attackers might focus their attacks specifically on
people who are likely to vote using the Internet.'15 For example, if an attacker wanted
to tamper with the Estonian online election, the attacker might first break into a pop-
ular Estonian web site (a new site, a bank site, etc.) and install some kind of malware
that could then infect visitors to that site. 116 Likewise, many voters' computers can
be directly attacked over their network connections.' 17 Attackers can use a variety of
"geo-location" techniques to focus their efforts exclusively on computers within the
country being attacked." 8 Any machine that has been compromised would then pre-
sumably act normally except when visiting the election authority's web site. " At that
point, it is trivial for the computer to show one thing to the voter while behaving in
an arbitrarily different fashion on the network. Voters would have no way of know-
ing whether their votes had been flipped. In fact, a custom-engineered attack could
erase itself subsequent to the election, leaving no trace of its presence. 2 °
The Estonian government implemented a number of particular security mea-
sures, notably a requirement that voters use the national ID card, a "smartcard," in
order to authenticate to the voting website.12 ' Estonia also allows voters to cast
multiple votes, with the last one counting. The government additionally allowed
Internet voters to vote subsequently in person, canceling out any prior electronic
vote. 122 With these mechanisms in mind, as they might well be copied with other
Internet-based voting schemes, 123 we can analyze the security of many other pro-
posed Internet voting systems.
Confidentiality attacks that rely on in-person observation of the voting process
(i.e., somebody watching over your shoulder as you vote) are ostensibly defeated by
". See Aviel Rubin, Security Considerations for Remote Electronic Voting Over the
Internet, http://www.avirubin.com/e-voting.security.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (detailing
Internet security considerations).
116 Cf id. at 3-4.
117 Id.
118 Id. For an example of software touting geo-location capabilities, visit http://www
.ip2location.com.
"9 Id. at 9-10.
120 Id.
121 See Meagher, supra note 113, at 356-58.
'22 These facts are based upon personal observation of the author.
123 See Meagher, supra note 113, at 351 n.4 (identifying other countries that have piloted
Internet elections).
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Estonia's multiple voting scheme, but in fact the attackers could well "borrow" the
voters' ID cards. With these ID cards, attackers could prevent subsequent online votes
and watch to make sure the voters do not attempt to go vote in person. These O(N)
attacks would be very difficult to defeat. More worrisome is the fact that the back-
end computers carefully track the binding between the voter and the more recently cast
vote. 24 This procedure could allow malicious code, in the back-end, to observe these
bindings-an 0(1) attack. Likewise, malicious client-side code, installed in a viral
fashion, could observe voters' actual behavior-another 0(1) attack.
Integrity attacks on the client side would rely on breaking into the voters' home
computers. It is difficult to estimate what percentage of these computers might be
vulnerable to modem attack tools, but the cost of breaking in is 0(1)-it is no more
effort to break into one system than a thousand systems. There may also be 0(1)
integrity attacks against the server side, depending on the particular details of how the
server has been implemented, how the cryptographic exchange works with the smart-
card, and so forth.I25 Given the difficulty inherent in building a secure web-facing
service, external attacks may always be feasible.'26 And, of course, insider attacks
would also be 0(1). If and when such attacks were detected, one could imagine
heavyweight solutions, such as discarding online votes and requiring voters to appear
in person. Clearly, an attacker would have to avoid the temptation to exert too much
influence on the election outcome in order to fly below the radar.
DoS attacks are trivially available with 0(1) effort. The elections web server
has finite resources that can be easily exhausted by standard Internet attack tools that
leverage vast numbers of compromised "zombie" computers to make requests as fast
as possible of the server) 27 Such "distributed denial of service" (DDoS) attacks
require extensive server-side resources to counter. 28 Google and Yahoo! engineers
will privately admit that despite the massive scale of their operations, they still worry
about DDoS attacks. If the biggest web services in the world have to worry about
DDoS attacks, an elections web server is clearly in trouble. DDoS attacks can also be
mounted against an entire country. Estonia, in fact, was attacked by (alleged) Russian
hackers in 2007, crippling large parts of the country's Internet infrastructure.'29 To
date, nobody has been charged with a crime. 3° If this were to occur during an
124 See id. at 357.
125 Rubin, supra note 115, at 6-8.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, THE
GUARDIAN (Manchester, Eng.), May 17,2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/
17/topstories3.russia.
130 Jose Nazario, Estonian DDoS Attacks-A Summary to Date, ARBOR NETWORKS
SECURrrY BLoG, May 17,2007, http:llasert.arbornetworks.con2007/05/estonian-ddos-attacks
-a-summary-to-date/.
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election, the Internet voting infrastructure would almost certainly fail. One could
imagine a variety of draconian solutions, including disabling the Internet connection
for the entire country. This measure would dampen attacks from outside the country,
but would do nothing if attackers had compromised systems within the country, or
set to mount their attacks autonomously.
In short, Internet voting in Estonia, via the failed SERVE project, or really any
other way of using the Internet to connect personal computers' web browsers to web
servers for purposes of casting votes, is subject to a variety of O(1) attacks. While
Estonians can at least fall back to other voting technologies, the push to adopt Internet
voting, even in limited trials, is inappropriately ignoring these glaring risks.
F. Future "End-to-End" Cryptographic Voting Systems
Cryptographers for the last two decades have been promoting a family of
mathematical techniques that lead to a property called "end-to-end verification" of
elections. 3' While specific techniques vary, there are several features these systems
all have in common. Voters still cast votes in a polling place, requiring and ensuring
their anonymity.'32 Whether using paper or an electronic voting machine, voters may
optionally leave the polls with some kind of "receipt" that will allow them to identify
a record corresponding to their vote on a public "bulletin board."133 The bulletin board
does not contain human-readable votes, but rather an encrypted form of the vote. "
The tallying process requires the participation of one or more trusted parties, and ulti-
mately yields both the election totals as well as a "proof' that can be verified by any-
body.135 Anybody can read the bulletin board and verify the computation that was
used to derive the vote totals, even though they could not have performed the whole
computation themselves.'36
Other properties vary. One clever idea from Benaloh allows any voter to
"challenge" any voting system to prove that it is properly encrypting the voter's
ballot. 37 The idea is that a normal DRE system would go through its normal dialog
with the voter until the voter agrees with the contents of the summary screen. 38 At
"' See Chaum et al., supra note 107, at § 1 (defining end-to-end voting systems); see also
Sandler et al., supra note 51, at 355 (defining end-to-end verifiable voting system as "one
that can prove to the voter that (1) her vote was cast as intended and (2) her vote was counted
as cast").
132 Chaum et al., supra note 107, at § 3.
131 Id.; Sandler et al., supra note 51, at 353.
'3 Sandler et al., supra note 51, at 352-53.
135 Id.
"~ Id; see Josh Benaloh, Ballot Casting Assurance Via Voter-Initiated Poll Station Auditing,
2 USENIX/ACCURATE ELECRoNIC VOTINGTECH. WORKSHOP 1, 1-2 (2008) (highlighting
the tension between vote encryption and voter-initiated auditing).
' See Benaloh, supra note 136, at 4-5.
131 Id. at 5.
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this point, the machine would generate the encrypted vote, sign it, and physically
print it.'39 The voter sees the printing taking place." At this point, the voter gets
one new question: "would you like to cast this ballot or challenge it?" If the voter
says "challenge," then the machine prints the encryption keys, allowing anybody to
decrypt the vote and make sure that it is as the voter intended; this vote will not be
counted.' 4' If the voter says "cast," then the machine throws away the key and casts
the vote. 42 These challenges allow roving election auditors to enter polling places
while the election is ongoing, set up video cameras as in parallel testing, and verify
that voting machines are behaving properly. 43 Unlike parallel testing, however, the
machines being tested are the very live machines being used by real voters.'" Varia-
tions on Benaloh's technique have already been implemented in two separate research
voting systems (VoteBox 145 and Helios'46).
In order to be concrete, we will analyze the security of VoteBox, "41 which feels
to most voters like a DRE voting system, and Scantegrity H, 141 which feels to most
voters like an optical scan voting system.
VoteBox, like any DRE, could be maliciously modified to record votes in the
order cast.' 4 Scantegrity, like any precinct optical scanner, has the same property.
Both are thus subject to O(P) anonymity attacks.
VoteBox and Scantegrity have very strong mechanisms to detect integrity attacks.
VoteBox's challenge mechanism can detect a misbehaving machine, as the election
is ongoing. 50 Scantegrity looks and feels much like a regular paper ballot, so it in-
herits the integrity benefits of paper ballots.' 5' Scantegrity also has mechanisms that
139 ld.
14 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
14 Id.; see also MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 18-19 (describing a regimen
for parallel testing).
14 Sandler et al., supra note 51, at 352 (describing the fundamental problem with parallel
testing as being "artificial": "the conditions under which the test is performed are not identical
to those of a real voter in a real election").
145 Id. at 349.
146 Ben Adida, Helios: Web-Based Open-Audit Voting, 17 USENIX SECuRrrY SYMP. 1
(2008), available at http://www.usenix.org/events/sec08/tech/full-papers/adida/adida.pdf.
Interestingly, Helios is a voting system implemented using standard web servers and clients.
However, it is explicitly intended only for "low coercion" elections. This makes Helios appro-
priate for electing the leader of an open-source software project or perhaps even for conduct-
ing Faculty Senate elections in a university setting. Helios was never intended for electing
politicians to important offices.
,47 Sandler et al., supra note 51.
148 Chaum et al., supra note 107, at § 1.
141 Sandler et al., supra note 51, at 356.
"5 Id. at 358.
' ' Chaum et al., supra note 107, at § 2.
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allow third parties to verify the tally and to challenge individual ballots, all without
revealing how any specific voter cast a ballot. 52 Impressively, neither VoteBox nor
Scantegrity is vulnerable at all to integrity attacks, assuming these systems are used
and audited properly. 5 3 If only a handful of votes are flipped, then they may go un-
detected, but the odds of successful integrity attacks decline quickly as more votes are
flipped. As such, most attempts to compromise ballot integrity will quickly degenerate
to DoS attacks, and even those may be recoverable.
DoS for Scantegrity is identical to precinct-based optical scan-all the same
O(P) attacks apply. 5 4 DoS for VoteBox is likewise still O(P), but VoteBox contains
a number of data replication features that at least make it a constant factor harder. 55
In particular, for precincts with many VoteBox systems, they would be networked
together, with each machine holding copies of the votes from every other
machine.'56 An attacker would need to successfully attack every VoteBox machine
in order to destroy the records of an election.157 Scantegrity, by virtue of the paper
ballots, is more robust against electronic tampering.5 8 However, there are still only
O(P) ballot boxes, themselves subject to physical tampering. In the end, while the
specific attacks would be quite different, VoteBox and Scantegrity both have O(P)
DoS vulnerabilities, allowing us to reasonably conclude that neither has a decisive
advantage in this respect.
The cryptography in VoteBox and many other end-to-end systems generally relies
on a notion of "election trustees" who hold "shares" of cryptographic key material
and must collaborate together to tally and decrypt the votes.' 59 Several 0(1) confi-
dentiality attacks exist if all the trustees collude together.'6° At that point, they could
decrypt any individual ballot (violating confidentiality), learning how a specific voter
152 Id. at § 4.8.
153 Id. at § 5; Sandler et al., supra note 51, at 361-62.
14 Chaum et al., supra note 107, at § 5 ("In our threat model, an adversary could be any
party, including a voter, pollworker, or election official. The goal of the adversary is to attack
the integrity of the election or exert undue influence over a voter. We do not consider attack
vectors applicable to all voting systems, such as denial of service attacks, given that these
attacks and countermeasures are not unique to Scantegrity II.").
1' Sandler et al., supra note 51, at 353-59.
156 Id. at 354-55.
157 Id.
158 Chaum et al., supra note 107, at § 1.
159 See, e.g., Sandler et al., supra note 51, at 361-62.
16 Cryptographic key sharing mechanisms can be configured to require every share-holder
to participate to perform a computation, or "threshold" schemes can be used that require
some k out of n participants. If at least one trustee is honest (or, with threshold schemes, if
a quorum of colluding trustees cannot be formed), then the system is secure. A malicious
trustee could potentially conduct an 0(1) DoS attack against the election by simply refusing
to participate, and thus preventing the decryption of the election totals, but this would be
impossible to do anonymously. Regular criminal penalties for this sort of behavior would
hopefully provide the necessary deterrence.
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cast his or her vote. However, they would be unable to delete ballots from the bulletin
board, as voters would be able to detect the absence of their ballots. 61 They could per-
haps add additional ballots, but these would need to have corresponding entries in poll
books.16 2 Ultimately, preventing ballot-stuffing attacks, in any voting technology,
relies on having good records of whether a voter has or has not cast a vote, along with
audits of these records for consistency with the number of cast ballots. 163 Scantegrity
places all of this trust in a central election administrator. 6' If corrupt, a Scantegrity
election administrator could violate the confidentiality of every ballot-an 0(1) attack.
(Generalizing Scantegrity to have a set of trustees rather than a single trusted election
administrator would be a straightforward extension to the system.)
VoteBox has one additional 0(1) DoS vulnerability: the destruction or loss of
trustees' cryptographic key materials. 165 While key shares could be copied or backed
up, this process would require careful design. Scantegrity is not vulnerable to a com-
parable attack because its paper ballots are always human readable and can be tallied
using traditional scanners or by hand.
An important concern with VoteBox, Scantegrity, or any other end-to-end crypto
voting system is what must happen if a fault is found."6 What should the proper pro-
cedure be if a voter can prove, beyond any doubt, that his or her ballot was not included
in the final tally? How many voters must provide such proof before the election
results are called into question? Ultimately, end-to-end crypto voting mechanisms
provide a great way of proving that an election was done properly.'67 Resolving
errors, omissions, or fraud, once they are shown to exist, is likely to be a more labor-
intensive process.
An intriguing issue for cryptography-intensive voting systems like VoteBox
and Scantegrity is the issue of the strength of the cryptosystem itself. Modem cryptog-
raphy rests on the computational difficulty of solving a number of "hard problems"
such as factoring very large numbers. What happens if and when a future cryptogra-
pher invents an effective attack against the cryptography? A breakthrough like this
would have ramifications well beyond the world of elections. Certainly, there would
be a period wherein older broken cryptographic algorithms would need to be replaced
161 Sandier et al., supra note 51, at 352-53.
162 Id. at 350.
163 See generally Daniel Sandier & Dan S. Wallach, Casting Votes in the Auditorium, 2
USENXI/ACCURATEELEcTRoNicVOTINGTEcH. WORKSHOP 1 (2007) (identifying the audi-
bility of elections as a significant issue in electronic voting, and proposing an auditing infra-
structure that provides "robust forensic documents" to verify the "global picture of critical
election-day events").
16 Chaum et al., supra note 107, at § 7.
165 Sandler et al., supra note 51, at 361-62.
166 See Benaloh, supra note 136 (providing an overview of ways to engage voters in
"interactive proofs" to ensure that their own votes are cast as intended).
167 Chaum et al., supra note 107, at § 8; Sandier et al., supra note 51, at 362.
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with newer, replacement algorithms. 168 The main concern, for elections, would be
that votes cast prior to the breakthrough could potentially be decrypted. (A similar
threat occurs if the "trustees" collude, as described above.) A cryptographic failure,
assuming it was known and corrected prior to the election, would not be usable to
compromise election integrity or availability.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The table below summarizes the complexity analysis of attacking a variety of
different voting technologies.
Confidentiality Integrity Denial of Service
Vote-by-mail O(N)-individual O(N)-individual O(N)-individual
voters selling their voters selling their voters selling their
votes votes votes
O(P)-postal O(P), possibly O(P), possibly
workers 0(1)-postal 0(1)-postal
0(1)-election workers workers
insiders 0(l)-election 0(l)-election
insiders insiders
Paperless 0(P) 0(I)* O(1)*
electronic
Electronic + 0(P) 0(P) 0(P)
VVPAT
Precinct 0(P) 0(P) 0(P)
optical scan
Internet 0(1) 0(1) 0(1)
voting
End-to-end O(P)-precinct impossible 0(P)
crypto voting tampering
(Scantegrity) 0(l)-corrupt
election
administrator
End-to-end O(P)-precinct impossible 0(P)
crypto voting tampering 0(1)--trustee key
(VoteBox) 0(1)-trustee loss
collusion
*These 0(1) attacks may be partially mitigated using complex procedures described
by Halderman et al.,16 9 which could strengthen the systems from 0(1) to O(P).
' See generally Halderman et al., supra note 71 (discussing integrating new voting
technology with systems already in place while ensuring secured transactions).
169 Id.
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Based on a straightforward complexity analysis of different voting technologies,
we can reach clear conclusions about their relative strengths and weaknesses. While
no voting system is perfect, understanding the relative effort required to mount an
attack is critical to allocating resources toward defeating these attacks. For example,
if election officials are conducting a vote-by-mail election, then clearly they need to
spend significant effort in their internal security procedures to detect and defeat the
constant cost threat of insider attacks. Likewise, the constant effort attacks against
Internet voting, and the lack of adequate remedies, provide more than sufficient justi-
fication to use other modalities for conducting elections. We do note that the Internet
is useful for connecting precincts back to election headquarters, so long as it is not
relied upon for election correctness. "° Another consistent theme is that election reg-
istration procedures should never record the order in which voters appear, as this
reduces the complexity of anonymity attacks across many different technologies.
Of voting technologies presently on the market and certified for use in most states,
precinct-based optical scanning systems appear to have the best resistance to security
attacks, based on our complexity analysis. Future cryptographic end-to-end systems
should be able to improve upon this, although it is an open question whether normal
voters would find these systems to be usable.
'70 Sandler et al., supra note 51.
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